OBFUSCURO: A Commodity Obfuscation Engine for Intel SGX

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(* denotes equal contribution)











Program Obfuscation

Trusted


Untrusted (except the Black box)



Wait, isn't that what Intel SGX does?




Intel SGX is not perfect!



Paging, Branch-prediction and Cache attacks!


[S&P14, SEC17, ASPLOS18, DIMVA17, WOOT17]

Learning from existing solutions!



Lesson #1

Ring-3 enclaves cannot hide access patterns through side-channels!




Lesson #2

Unreliable timers for SGX enclaves!

Our approach

- Indistinguishable enclave program(s)
 - A code block executed N times on C-Pad, and data block accessed from D-Pad
 - C-Pad and D-Pad are one cache-line (64B) in size!

Instead of *trying to hide* traces, all enclaves should leak *the same* traces!



Let Hermione explain!



Cool, what's the challenge?

Naïve solution

Use a <u>software-translator</u> to copy all code and data onto C/D-Pad


different branches! **C1.** Native code is C-Pad 63 not in 64B blocks! **Enclave Storage** Bar Foo Foo C4. Timing issues **Translator 56B** Foo Bar jmp jmp not even discussed! imp **78B** Bar **64**B **67B** Main **D-Pad C2.** Access patterns leaked while copying!

C3. Code can have

64B


Obfuscuro

- Program obfuscation on Intel SGX
 - All programs should exhibit <u>same patterns</u> irrespective of logic/input.
 - Adapted from Harry Potter spell "Obscuro" (translation :> Darkness)




C1. Enforce code blocks of identical sizes

Break code blocks into 64 bytes and pad using nop



Foo.1()



C2. Securely loading C/D-Pad

- Fetch code and data using Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
 - The code and data is fetched onto <u>C-Pad</u> and <u>D-Pad</u> resp.

Execute new

Update C-Pad with

Retrieve the block

Side-channel-resistant ORAM scheme ensures no leakage as C/D-Pad are loaded!




C3. Align branches to/from C-Pad

- Each instrumented code block has two branches to fixed locations
 - C-Pad → Code-Controller
 - C-Pad → Data-Controller

Code execution model

All Obfuscuro programs execute the same sequence of branches!




C4. Ensuring execution time consistency

• The program executes <u>fixed</u> number of code blocks



Execute N code blocks to ensure all programs terminate consistently!



Faster memory store for enclaves

• Use AVX registers as store instead of "Oblivious" store

DRAM-based Have to *sequentially* access all memory indices

AVX registers can be used as a *faster*, oblivious storage for SGX enclaves!



Implementation

LLVM compiler suite (3117 LoC)

- Breaks all code into similar blocks (C1)
- Instrument and align all control and data-flow instructions (C3)


Runtime library (2179 LoC)

- Initializes ORAM trees and performs secure ORAM operations (C2)
- Terminate program and fetch output (C4)

Intel SGX SDK (25 LoC)

Assign memory regions for C/D-Pad (support)

Performance Evaluation



Ending Remarks!


- 1. Program obfuscation is a *remarkable dream* to achieve
- 2. Various <u>software/hardware limitations</u> *hinder* the realization of program obfuscation on Intel SGX
- 3. Existing solutions have a *limited approach* towards side-channel mitigation in Intel SGX
- 4. Obfuscuro is compiler-based scheme which addresses this issue by ensuring all programs leak *same access patterns*

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Execution Time Evaluation



ORAM access time dominates the time of code block execution!