rORAM: Efficient Range ORAM with Locality

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Its all about the Clouds!



Protecting Outsourced Data



- Access pattern disclosure on searchable encryption: Ramification, attack and mitigation. Islam et al. NDSS, '12
- Connecting the Dots: Privacy Leakage via Write-Access Patterns to the Main Memory. John et al. HOST, '17

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Oblivious RAM (ORAM)



Observing the physical memory accesses, an adversary cannot learn

- 1. Which item has been accessed.
- 2. What operation has been performed.

Path ORAM [Stefanov et al. CCS '13]



Path ORAM Evictions



SERVER V_3 V_1 V_2

Can also evict along pre-determined paths

Path ORAM: Performance Metrics

Bandwidth: $O(\log n)$, worst-case

Round-trips: 1 RT per access

Computational complexity: trivial

Locality of Access:

- # of seeks: $O(\log n)$
- Access seq. chunk: O(chunkSize * logN)



Why Locality of Access?

- \circ HDD: 1 seek = 10,000x slower
- \circ SSD: Random placement \Rightarrow Significant wear
- o File systems
 - caching, prefetching require data locality
- Applications with range queries e.g., GIS



Locality-Privacy Tradeoff

Data locality for "free"?

What can we afford to leak? Sequential access size?

[Asharov '17]

Why is this acceptable?

Range ORAM: Locality-Optimized Range Queries

Range ORAM [Asharov et al. '17]: For range query of size r ✓ 0 (log³ N) seeks ✓ 0 (r. log³ N) bandwidth required

rORAM:

- $\checkmark O(\log N) \times \text{fewer seeks}$
- ✓ $O(\log N)$ x lower bandwidth required



rORAM

- $l \in O(\log N)$ independent ORAMs
- Data is duplicated



- For R_l:
 - # of seeks for reading (r= 2¹) blocks in range: O(logN) ind. of r
 - # of seeks for evicting $(r=2^1)$ blocks: O(logN) ind. of r

Insight 1: Locality-Optimized Layout

Problem: Evicting *r* blocks requires O(r*logN) seeks

Observation: Eviction Path Selection is Deterministic

 \Rightarrow Paths for <u>consecutive</u> evictions known apriori

 $V_{n/2}$

 V_{n-2}

 V_{n-1}

- \Rightarrow Order in which nodes are accessed <u>per level</u> known apriori
- \Rightarrow Perform evictions level-wise

. . . .

 V_1

 V_0



Batching Evictions Example



Batch *r* evictions: O(log N) seeks

Insight 2: Locality-Optimized Re-Mapping

Problem: Reading *r* blocks in range requires O(r*logN) seeks

Idea: Any *r* <u>consecutive</u> eviction paths can be read with O(logN) seeks Map Blocks in Range to Consecutive Eviction Paths



Remap: [a, a+1, ..., a+r-1]



ReadRange [a, b], b=a+r-1: O(logN) seeks

Access Protocol

Access[2, 5]



of Seeks :

- O(logN) disk seeks for ReadRange from R₂
- O(logN) disk seeks for BatchEvict to Ri $O(log^2N)$ seeks in total

Insight 3: Distributed Position Map



Insight: Reuse paths in ORAMs R₀, R₁, ... R₁

How do we know where block 2 is in R_0 , R_1 , ...?

• *O*(log*N*) position map accesses

Pointer-based Oblivious Data Structure

- With each block, store pointers to its location in other ORAMs
- Locate position for "free" with reads

data	а	p_0	p_1		₽ℓ
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Asymptotic Performance

Access[j, j + r - 1]:

$\checkmark O(logN)$ x fewer seeks

✓ O(logN)x lower bandwidth required

	Seeks	Bandwidth	Server Space	Leakage
PathORAM	O(r.log ² N)	O(r.log ² N)	O(N)	none
rORAM	O(log ² N)	O(r.log ² N)	O(NlogN)	Range size
Asharov et al.	O(log ³ N)	O(r.log ³ N)	O(NlogN)	Range size
Demertzis et al.	O(r)	O(r.N ^{1/3} .log ² N)	O(N)	none

Query Access Time

Local HDD (logscale, higher is better)



30 – 50x speedup, range size >= 32 blocks

10x speedup, range size >= 64 blocks

Network Block Device

(logscale, higher is better)

Throughput



File Server = 5x, Video Server = 11x

File Server = 2x, Video Server = 4x

Summary

Practical Range ORAM

- ✓ $O(\log N)$ x fewer seeks
- ✓ $O(\log N)$ x lower bandwidth required

Optimized for Real World Applications

Can we do better?

app-specific optimizations

What I am working on

I am on the job market!

Oblivious RAM [NDSS '19, '19]



Plausible Deniability [PETS '17, '19]



Integrity-Preserving Block Storage [ApSys '17]



History Independence [TIFS '15]



Secure CPU Architecture & Secure

Virtualization



Query Authentication [TKDE]

Thank you!!

