Digital Healthcare-Associated Infection: A Case Study on the Security of a Major Multi-Campus Hospital System

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Two worlds colliding

Medical devices



[1] Halperin, Daniel, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Benjamin Ransford, Shane S. Clark, Benessa Defend, Will Morgan, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, and William H. Maisel. "Pacemakers and implantable cardiac defibrillators: Software radio attacks and zero-power defenses." In Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008. IEEE Symposium on, pp. 129-142. IEEE, 2008. [2] Li, C., Raghunathan, A., & Jha, N. K. (2011, June). Hijacking an insulin pump: Security attacks and defenses for a diabetes therapy system. In *e-Health Networking Applications and Services (Healthcom), 2011 13th* IEEE International Conference on (pp. 150-156). IEEE.

[3] Bonaci, T., Herron, J., Yusuf, T., Yan, J., Kohno, T., & Chizeck, H. J. (2015). To make a robot secure: An experimental analysis of cyber security threats against teleoperated surgical robots. arXiv preprint arXiv: 1504.04339.

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enterprise studies










Operational environment?



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While network studies have been useful in many enterprises, performing such a study on a hospital requires special care... as they contain unique data types and any unscheduled downtime to hospital devices can cause life-threatening situations.

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In this talk, we discuss...

Ethical challenges in the design process

Characterization of the hospital network

Measurement results from network traffic

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Designing an ethical study

- What would an enterprise study look like?
- By design, the study should minimizes any potential for negative impacts • Two-year process involving legal-IT-IRB teams of the university/hospital
- Two specification were placed:
 - Keep patients/workers information private
 - Must not disrupt daily operations









Limitations on data collection

- Private information
 - Packet payloads
 - P7P
 - HTTP
 - DHCP
- Undistributed daily operations
 - Strictly passive (no nmap or similar)
- Agreement with the hospital
 - Would <u>you</u> let a stranger look into your network?



The design process posed limitations but it is an **absolutely critical** <u>component</u> of ethical research





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
Characterization of the hospital network

Measurement results from network traffic

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Observed hospital topology



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Medical devices were actively protected and mostly invisible from a network perspective (both internally and externally)







Data sources

• Hospital logs (6 month - 418GB of raw logs) DNS requests (725 million request) Established TLS handshakes (325 million sessions) Certificates • OSINT — ground truth Alexa & Umbrella top sites Blacklists (5 sources) Certificate Transparency (CT) logs Censys









Insights of the hospital network

Who the medical supporting devices are communicating with

How they are establishing communications channels

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Categorizing DNS requests

Hospitals can benefit from having customized blacklist/whitelists techniques

whitelisted based on top 100k Self-association metric domains of OpenDNS (15.75%) (64%) (~20%) no category (0.0|%)Blacklisted requests Botnet related requests (Zeus & Feodo)



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TLS communication breakdown

Communication establishment mostly follow good cryptographic practices Traffic

Connections (100%)

Secure **AES-GCM** ChaCha20-Poly1305 ECDSA SHA2

Weak CBC RSA-PKCS#1v1. $\mathfrak{F} = TLS1.2$

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Insecure


SHA1 RC4 3DES

Broken Anonymous DH MD5 DES Export





Hashing used in connections



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- MD5 (<1.5%)
- Secure hash
 - Hospital (72%)
 - Baseline(62%)
- SHA1 usage did not change


Secure authentication of end points is more common in the hospital than the baseline







TLS configuration of devices



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
What about the certificates?

- 9% of connection reported with some issue
 - Certificates with no issuer (~11%)
 - Self-signed/expired certificates
- Certificate Transparency?
 - ~60% of hospital certificates found in CT

The hospital adoption of CT is slower than the Internet's top services.

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Limitations

- from network egress/ingress point of view
 - Passwords get compromised
 - Misplaced end devices
 - Theft
 - Access control



Hospital security is multidimensional and requires more research aside





Take away

- Hospital research requires careful consideration/collaboration from legal, ethical, and administrative domains
- The case study showed traffic isolation and good cryptographic practices
- This work sets a starting point for broader examinations of hospitals



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Extras

Interesting Findings

- Medical devices appear to be highly protected in the operational environment • Standard categorization techniques do not adequately represent the hospital • The hospital follows good cryptographic practices

- While Certificate Transparency gained a lot of traction, there is still room to grow regarding hospital work







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
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Cipher quality handshakes



--- Secure AES-GCM ChaCha2-Poly1305 ECDSA SHA2 ---- Weak CBC RSA-PKCS#1v1.5



---- Insecure SHA1 RC4 3DES Broken
Anonymous DH
MD5
DES
Export

Open areas of research

- Generalizing Hospital Ecosystems
 - Are other hospitals configured the same way?
 - Size of hospital/funding available security team
- Network study solely based on the medical devices
- Understanding non-technical issues face by hospitals



