


YODA: Enabling Computationally Intensive Contracts in Blockchains with Byzantine and Selfish nodes

Sourav Das, Vinay J. Ribeiro, and Abhijeet Anand
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi


Smart Contracts



- Fair exchange of goods
- Fair public auctions

Correctness of Contract Execution

- Verification of Contract by Re-execution



- How to deal with Verifier's Dilemma?
 - **Limit** maximum amount computation a transaction can invoke.
 - **BlockGasLimit** in Ethereum.
 - ~500k instructions per second
- Consequence of Re-executing contracts for Verification
 - Can't Execute large (Computationally Intensive) functions/ smart contracts
- Need of executing large functions in Blockchain
 - Playing **Online Games**.
 - **Privacy preserving computation**, e.g: FHE, Zero-Knowledge protocols
 - **Machine Learning** on Blockchain

YODA: Enabling Computationally intensive contracts in Blockchains with **Byzantine** and **Selfish** nodes.

Outline

- Introduction and Motivation
- System Model
- YODA Overview
- MiRACLE
- RICE
- Evaluation


System Model

- Blockchain c
 - <50% of the nodes in the system are online.
 - Underlying blockchain guarantees **Correctness** and **Availability**
- Transactions are Executed Correctly
- Transactions get Included within bounded delay


• Definitions

- **Computationally Intensive Transactions** (CITs) invoke functions that are larger than Block Limit Threshold.
- **non-CIT**: Transactions that are not CITs.
- YODA executes CITs **off-chain**, i.e only by a subset of no
- non-CITs are executed **on-chain** i.e by all miners. Identical

What does **off-chain** Execution mean?




YODA's Off-Chain solution



- Requirements from YODA


- Small ES
- 50% adversarial
- β error Probability

How does YODA meet these requirements?





Byzantine and ~~Selfish~~ Honest nodes in SP


- **Honest** nodes: always submit correct execution result of CITs
- Consider a **Naive Solution** using sampling



For $|SP| = 1600$ and $f_{max} = 0.35$, $|ES| \approx 900$. $\beta = 10^{-20}$



MiRACLE Algorithm via Examples



Case II: MiRACLE has to identify correct solution from d_1 and d_2 .

MiRACLE: Case II

$$(d_1, c_1)$$

$$(d_2, c_2)$$

Two Hypothesis: $H_1 : d_1$ is correct solution

$H_2 : d_2$ is correct solution

Compute Likelihood: $L_{1,1} = (c_1^2 - e_1^2)$


$L_{2,1} = (c_2^2 - e_1^2)$

If $L_i > \mathbb{T}$ for $\mathbb{T} = \ln\left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) \frac{2q(1-q)Mf_{max}(1-f_{max})}{(1-f_{max})-f_{max}}$ $\xrightarrow{\text{YES}}$ d_i

NO

$$(d_1, \delta_1)$$

$$(d_2, \delta_2)$$



Compute Likelihood: $L_{1,2} = L_{1,1} + (\delta_1^2 - \delta_1^2)$



$L_{2,2} = L_{2,1} + (\delta_2^2 - \delta_1^2)$

$L_{i,2} > \mathbb{T} ? \xrightarrow{\text{YES}}$ d_i


NO

MiRACLE terminates in expected $\frac{(1-\beta) \ln\left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) + \beta \ln\left(\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}\right)}{A(f_{max}, |SP|, |ES|)}$ rounds

MIRACLE: Case III



⋮




$$L_{i,k} = \sum_{j=1}^i (c_{j,k}^2 - (C_j - c_{j,k})^2)$$

If $L_{i,k} \geq \mathbb{T}$, for any k ? **YES** Declare d_k as correct digest

MiRACLE: Theoretical Results

- Terminates with correct solution with Probability $1 - \beta$
- Terminates with only single solution
- Best strategy for adversary is to submit single solution




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- MiRACLE
- Selfish nodes in SP (RICE)
- Evaluation

Byzantine and Selfish ~~Honest~~ nodes in SP

- **Selfish** Node: seeks to maximize (reward for computation - cost of computation)
- Skip computation if they can guess the result beforehand
 - Using information available in the Blockchain
 - Colluding with other ES nodes.
- **MIRACLE is not sufficient with Selfish nodes**





- Why is this an issue?
- If d_k is an incorrect digest?

RICE: Randomness Inserted Contract Execution

- ES nodes submit a solution $d || seed^{(j)}$ ← round number


Solution of CIT

Round-dependent pseudorandom value




Choosing Indices in RICE


- Keep the number of updates small.



- Fixed size interval (k), $O(T)$ updates



- Interval doubling after every step, $O(\log_2 T)$ updates
- Gap between last update and T could be $\frac{T}{2}$




- YODA considers i interval of size 2^i
- $O(\log_2^2(T))$ updates, last gap $\frac{T}{\log_2 T}$

Outline


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CICs in YODA



Gas Usage (multiples of 5.3), $|ES| = 40$

Figure 3: Measured CIC execution time with varying gas usage.



Parallel CICs, $|ES| = 40$

Figure 4: Average digest commit time with increasing number of parallel ITs.


Additionally in paper.

- Security properties on MiRACLE and RICE
- Collusion among ES nodes from same rounds
- Fair reward mechanism
- Incentive compatibility of YODA (ϵ -Nash equilibrium)
- Implementation and Evaluation details

Thank You

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Putting it all together on a blockchain



MIRACLE (Pseudocode)

Algorithm 1 MIRACLE

```
1:  $i \leftarrow 1$ 
2: while  $L_{k,i} \leq \mathbb{T} \forall k$  do
3:    $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
4:   Pick next ES to execute  $\Psi(x)$ 
5: end while
6: declare  $d_{k'}$  to be correct where  $L_{k',i} > \mathbb{T}$ 
```
