



Horst Görtz Institute
for IT-Security

On Using Application-Layer Middlebox Protocols for Peeking Behind NAT Gateways

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External Network




B
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Internal Network



Motivation

External Network




B
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Internal Network



Motivation

External Network



**B
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Y**

Internal Network



Proxy Protocols

Open connection for me!



HTTP

SOCKS

Proxy Protocols

Open connection for me!



HTTP

SOCKS

NAT Traversal Protocols

Forward traffic to me!



UPnP IGD

NAT-PMP


PCP

Idea!

What if we could use these protocols to access networks that are otherwise “hidden”?

Universal Plug'n'Play (UPnP)

Local Network



UPnP[™]



Local Network

Hey, anyone out there?



UPnP[™]



Local Network



Hi, it's me, your telly!



¡Hola! Did someone ask for cameras?



Hallo, your router here!



Local Network



UPnP - Finding Services



Ah, there you are!

What can you do for me?



UPnP - Finding Services



Ah, there you are!
What can you do for me?

Well, I can do many things!
How about a port forward?



UPnP - Executing Actions



Good idea!
I'm waiting for friends on 1234/UDP.
Would you mind letting them in?



UPnP - Executing Actions



Good idea!
I'm waiting for friends on 1234/UDP.
Would you mind letting them in?

Consider it done!




What if I say that there are UPnP devices exposed to the Internet?

Finding UPnP IGD Devices on the Internet

Our Approach


1. Discovering UPnP Devices
2. Finding IGD Services
3. Enumerating Existing Forwards

1. Discovering UPnP Devices




UPnP Devices (2,800,000 hosts)

DoS Amplifiers: 2.8M




UPnP Devices (2,800,000 hosts)

DoS Amplifiers: 2.8M



With vanilla ZMap


2. Finding WAN*Connection services




Exposed HTTP endpoints (1,100,000 hosts)

DoS Amplifiers: 2.8M

Control endpoints: 1,1M



Exposed Port Forward Controls (480,000 hosts)



3. Listing Existing Port Forwards

Enumerate incrementing *index* until receiving an error.

```
POST /ctl/IPConn HTTP/1.1
<GetGenericPortMappingEntry>
  <NewPortMappingIndex>index</NewPortMappingIndex>
</GetGenericPortMappingEntry>
```



3. Listing Existing Port Forwards

Enumerate incrementing *index* until receiving an error.

```
POST /ctl/IPConn HTTP/1.1
<GetGenericPortMappingEntry>
  <NewPortMappingIndex>index</NewPortMappingIndex>
</GetGenericPortMappingEntry>
```

```
<GetGenericPortMappingEntryResponse>
  <NewExternalPort>1337</NewExternalPort>
  <NewInternalClient>127.0.0.1</NewInternalClient>
  <NewInternalPort>443</NewInternalPort>
  <NewProtocol>TCP</NewProtocol>
  <NewPortMappingDescription>
    Allow remote configuration!
  </NewPortMappingDescription>
</GetGenericPortMappingEntryResponse>
```



3. Listing Existing Port Forwards

Enumerate incrementing *index* until receiving an error.

POST **/ctl/IPConn** HTTP/1.1

<GetGenericPortMappingEntryResponse>
<NewPortMappingEntry>
<NewInternalClient>
</GetGenericPortMappingEntryResponse>

Source & destination,
protocol


MappingIndex>



<GetGenericPortMappingEntryResponse>
<NewExternalPort>**1337**</NewExternalPort>
<NewInternalClient>**127.0.0.1**</NewInternalClient>
<NewInternalPort>**443**</NewInternalPort>
<NewProtocol>**TCP**</NewProtocol>
<NewPortMappingDescription>
Allow remote configuration!
</NewPortMappingDescription>
</GetGenericPortMappingEntryResponse>

Description

Hosts with Forwards (130,000 hosts)



Categorizing Forwards

1. Forwards with “galleta silenciosa” (42,000 hosts)
2. Forwards to external target IP addresses (18,000 hosts)
3. Rest of the forwards we consider benign (110,000 hosts)

Galleta silenciosa – Silent cookie (On 42,000 hosts)





:12345 -> 192.168.1.2:139

:31235 -> 192.168.1.3:139


192.168.1.0/24




Galleta silenciosa – Silent cookie (On 42,000 hosts)




External Forwards (on 18,000 hosts)



External Forwards (on 18,000 hosts)



External Forwards (on 18,000 hosts)



Benign Forwards (on 110,000 hosts)

- Torrent clients (uTorrent, libtorrent, ..)
- Chat software (Whatsapp, Wechat, ..)

Conclusion

UPnP

- Ubiquitous in home networks (tester in our github repo!)
- Unfortunately **still** exposed to the Internet

UPnP IGD

- Allows configuring port forwards
- Actively misused by malicious actors

Remediation

- Filter ingress 1900/UDP (common industry practice)

Internet Proxies

Proxy Protocols

Open connection for me!



HTTP

SOCKS

- Non-persistent, temporary relays
- We did an extensive analysis of the proxy ecosystem
- Found 690,000 proxies, **3% (20,000)** were open proxies!

Checking for Internal Access (on open proxies)

CONNECT **127.0.0.1:22** HTTP/1.1

HTTP Proxy

21

22


23

25


80

Services listening on localhost


Checking for Internal Access (on open proxies)




Checking for Internal Access (on open proxies)




Checking for Internal Access (on open proxies)



Checking for Internal Access (on open proxies)



Checking for Internal Access (on open proxies)



Takeaways

- Two examples of protocols for crossing network boundaries
- Enabling **unwanted** access to internal networks
- At least one type is being actively exploited!

Thanks for your attention!

Takeaways

- Two examples of protocols for crossing network boundaries
- Enabling **unwanted** access to internal networks
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Thanks for your attention!

<https://github.com/RUB-SysSec/MiddleboxProtocolStudy/>