

Snappy

Fast On-chain Payments with Practical Collaterals

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Cryptocurrencies based on permissionless blockchains could

- ❖ Decentralize the global financial system
- ❖ Reduce trust assumptions
- ❖ Increase operational transparency
- ❖ Improve user privacy



Open Challenges

	Centralized Processors	Permissionless Blockchains
Throughput	Thousands of txs/sec	Tenths of txs/sec
Latency	Confirmation in <3 sec	Minutes to finality
Privacy	Trusted third party needed	[0, full privacy)

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- *Retail Payments*
- *Point-of-Sale Purchases*
- *Time-critical Transactions*

On-chain Improvements

- e.g., Proof-of-Stake, Sharding
- Improve the throughput of the blockchain.
- Improve latency only under a relaxed threat model.

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No improvement in latency under the original threat model.

Layer 2 Protocols

- Move transactions off the chain.
- Use the blockchain only when necessary.
- High-throughput and low-latency.

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Payment channels

- ❖ Large amount of locked-in funds for customers.
- ❖ Require a separate deposit for each channel.
- ❖ Pre-deposit their future expenditure.

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Payment networks, Payment hubs, Side-chains

- ❖ Incompatible with the unilateral nature of retail payments (no rebalancing).
- ❖ Additional trust assumptions.

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- Low latency (<2 secs) suitable for retail payments.
- Operates on top of low-throughput and high-latency blockchains.
- Future on top of high-throughput and high/mid-latency blockchains.

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Key Features

- ❖ No changes to the underlying consensus protocol.
- ❖ No additional trust assumptions.
- ❖ No additional operational requirements.



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Key Features


- ❖ No changes to the underlying consensus protocol.
- ❖ No additional trust assumptions.
- ❖ No additional operational requirements.
- ❖ **Small opportunity cost.**
- ❖ **Requires smartcontract language.**



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Application scenarios


- ❖ A large number of users (e.g., 1,000,000 customers).
- ❖ A moderate set of recipients (e.g., 100 merchants).



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
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- ❖ Small- to mid-value transactions.



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- ❖ A moderate set of recipients (e.g., 100 merchants).
- ❖ Users pay the recipients.
- ❖ Small- to mid-value transactions.
- ❖ The recipients give the products, once they receive the funds.



How does latency occur?

- ❖ Block interval (e.g., ~13 seconds for Ethereum)
- ❖ Probabilistic finality (>1 confirmations)
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
Can we do zero-confirmation txs?



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Trivial Solutions

- ❖ Convince your supermarket to trust you?
- ❖ Pre-deposit funds to your local supermarket?
- ❖ Try to catch double-spending early?

Trivial Solutions


- ❖ Convince your supermarket to trust you?
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Can we do better?

- ❖ Customers keep their money in their wallet.
- ❖ Merchants guaranteed to get their money.
- ❖ No trust to/reliance on third parties.


Idea: Collaterals

1. Customer places collateral (e.g., \$100) on a smartcontract.
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


A settlement “claim” requires

- ❖ The payment transaction (given to the merchant by the customer).
- ❖ Its conflicting transaction (from the blockchain).
- ❖ In Ethereum, conflicting transactions share the same *nonce*.

The collateral is used only when doublespending!


Triple-spending Attack




Scaling collaterals to multiple merchants

- ❖ Need to keep track of “pending” transactions.
- ❖ Merchants accept payment, if the collateral suffices for everyone.


Proposal #1: Trusted Merchants




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
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
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
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
Drawbacks

- ❖ Assumes all merchants are trustworthy.
- ❖ Requires 100% availability of all merchants.


Side-chain variant

- ❖ Additional trust assumptions
- ❖ e.g., BFT -> 1/3 malicious merchants


Proposal #2: Trusted Third Party




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
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


Drawbacks

- What if the statekeeper equivocates?
- What if the statekeeper colludes with customers?

Proposal #3: Untrusted Third Party

- ❖ Almost the same as before
- ❖ Statekeeper places collateral per merchant.
- ❖ If the customer's collateral get depleted, the statekeeper's collateral is used.




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
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
- We still rely on a third party.




Snappy: Statekeeping Merchants




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
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
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
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
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


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


Approval: "I haven't approved another transaction from c_1 with the same index number."


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
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
Proof of Merchant Equivocation



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


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
Approval Protocol

1. The customer initializes the payment.
2. Merchant verifies the collateral suffices.
3. Payment approval (50%+1).
4. Statekeeper evaluation.
5. Signature aggregation (e.g., BLS).
6. Customer signs final transaction.
7. Merchant verifies and completes checkout.
8. Transaction logged in blockchain and by the smartcontract.




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Scalability: Latency



Scalability: Small Collaterals

- ❖ Only need to cover the expenditure within the latency period.
- ❖ Reusable.
- ❖ Flexible.
- ❖ Independent of the number of customers.

Takeaways

- ❖ An honest merchant never loses funds.
- ❖ Deployable on top of existing blockchains (e.g.,Ethereum).
- ❖ No additional trust assumptions.
- ❖ Small amount of locked in funds.
- ❖ Very low latency.

Thank you! Questions?

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