

ABC: Enabling Smartphone Authentication with Built-in Camera

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


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The State University of New York



Camera Identification: Hardware Distortion


- Manufacturing imperfection leads to pattern noise: Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU)[1]



[1] LUKAS, J., FRIDRICH, J., AND GOLJAN, M. Digital camera identification from sensor pattern noise. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 1, 2 (2006), 205–214.

Camera Identification: Fingerprint Matching

- Given an image, determine if it is captured by a camera of interest



From Camera Identification to Smartphone Identification

- Smartphone cameras have displaced the conventional digital camera
- Smartphones are widely used in security sensitive tasks




Smartphone Camera VS Digital Camera

Sensor Name	Medium Format	Full Frame	APS-H	APS-C	4/3	1"	1/1.63"	1/2.3"	1/3.2"
Sensor Size	53.7 x 40.2mm	36 x 23.9mm	27.9x18.6mm	23.6x15.8mm	17.3x13mm	13.2x8.8mm	8.38x5.59mm	6.16x4.62mm	4.54x3.42mm
Sensor Area	21.59 cm ²	8.6 cm ²	5.19 cm ²	3.73 cm ²	2.25 cm ²	1.16 cm ²	0.47 cm ²	0.28 cm ²	0.15 cm ²
Crop Factor	0.64	1.0	1.29	1.52	2.0	2.7	4.3	5.62	7.61
Image									
Example									




Smartphone Camera: Stronger Non-Uniformity

- The reduction in dimension amplifies the pixels' non-uniformity




Smartphone Camera: Higher Identification Accuracy

- **One image alone** can uniquely identify a smartphone camera




Smartphone Authentication Scenario

- The user proves her identity to the verifier using her **smartphone** as a **security token**
- The verifier authenticates the user's smartphone by checking the **fingerprint** of its built-in camera



A Strawman Solution




Security Risk 1: Fingerprint Leakage

- Images captured by smartphone cameras, in most cases, are available to the public



Facebook



Instagram



Wechat

Fingerprint Leakage: The Replay Attack



Solution: Randomized QR Code

- Liveness detection:
 - Challenge the user to capture a freshly generated QR code

Accurate

Efficient

Easy to randomize

Easy to align



Image submitted to the authentication system should match the challenge

Security Risk 2: Fingerprint Forgery

- An adversary can manipulate an image's fingerprint and fabricate forged images




Fingerprint Injection



Fingerprint Removal

Fingerprint Forgery: The Injection Attack




Injection Detection

- Detect forged images that carry injected fingerprints




Normal Image VS Forged Image

- The generation of normal images




Normal Image VS Forged Image

- The generation of forged images



Normal Image VS Forged Image

- Forged images carry the **foreign fingerprint** of the adversary's smartphone camera




Solution: Correlation Test


- Revised challenge response process:
 - Challenge the user to capture and upload **two** freshly generated QR codes.




Solution: Correlation Test



Injection Detection: Normal Image Pair




Injection Detection: Forged Image Pair



Effectiveness of Injection Detection

- 16,000 images from **Amazon Mechanical Turk**
 - iPhone 6: 400 forged image pairs and 450 normal image pairs
 - Galaxy Note 5: 1600 forged image pairs and 1400 normal image pairs



Authentication Work Flow

What if the adversary **removes** his camera fingerprint?




Removal Detection

- Detect forged images that have been sanitized (fingerprint removal)




Normal Image VS Forged Image

- All **white Gaussian noise components** will be removed in the process of fingerprint removal




Solution: Probe Signal

- Embed a probe signal that will be removed by the fingerprint removal process




Solution: Probe Signal

- Detect removal attacks by checking the existence of the probe signal




Solution: Probe Signal

- Detect removal attacks through checking the existence of the probe signal



Effectiveness of Removal Detection


- Setting 1: Target scene have **no probe signal**.
- Setting 2: Target scene have **a probe signal. Normal Image**.
- Setting 3: Target scene have **a probe signal. Removal Attack**.




1. The probe signal is **preserved** in legitimate image tokens. (Setting **1** VS Setting **2**)
2. The probe signal is suppressed in forged images. (Setting **2** VS Setting **3**)

Forged images can be easily detected

Full-fledged Authentication Protocol



The Attack Detection Flow




Efficiency


- Image Content Matching:
 - Determined by the **version of the applied QR code**. Normally can be finished **within 0.1 second**.
- Fingerprint Matching:
 - Determined by the **resolution of the captured image**. This is the **most time consuming** part.
- Injection Detection:
 - Determined by the **resolution of the captured image**. Normally can be finished **within 0.5 second**.
- Removal Detection:
 - Determined by the **resolution of the probe signal**. It takes **at most 0.9 second**.

Efficiency

Test#	1	2	3	4	5	6
Image Resolution	640x480	960x720	1280x960	1600x1200	2048x1152	3264x2448
Probe Resolution	200x200	200x200	400x400	400x400	400x400	800x800



Fingerprint Matching



Overall Efficiency

What Factors can Influence PRNU?

- Does PRNU change over **time**?
 - **No**
- Will the **ambient environment** affect the fingerprint on an image?
 - Only **ambient light intensity**.
- What is the relationship between an image's **resolution** and the strength of its fingerprint?
 - **Positively correlated**

Conclusion

- The first work to enable smartphone authentication using built-in camera
 - **Accurate** and **efficient** identification
 - **Resilient** to fingerprint **leakage** and **forgery**

Thank you! Questions?

Reinforced Fingerprint Forgery: the Removal Attack

