

# Dial One for Scam: A Large-Scale Analysis of Technical Support Scams

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
Nick Nikiforakis

# What are Tech Support Scams?

# Tech Support Scam Evolution

- 2008 Fake support cold calls
- 2013 A Twist: Scammers started to use malvertising
- 2014 IC3 issued a public service announcement
- 2014 Microsoft sued several campaigns
- 2015 FTC took down several big campaigns
- 2016 IC3 issued a public service announcement
- 2017 Got more aggressive and still an increasing threat

# Tech Support Scam (Cold Calls)




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# Tech Support Scam (malvertising)



concealed significant engineering continue com  
page password technical technicians cause  
theft response situation copyright major  
warning blocked services call classified visit  
caused disk blocked services call reserved connection fix  
leaked attack oops tracking logs auto live apply deleted  
shut contacting unknown tracking logs auto live based  
follow attention breach carry duped run  
frame stalkers using address hacked disabled wrong  
location registry worm result message www port  
actions registry virus financial disabled wrong  
calling registry virus financial disabled wrong  
removed dear pop communications webcam malware social  
current acts access suspended prevent inject software  
viruses right harmful info restart program warriors often  
crash browsing passwords especially causing  
type logins details something containing form  
harmful useful reason anonymous terms hard





# Tech Support Scam Page(I)

```
* Starting System V initialisation compatibility[ OK ]
* Stopping flush early job output to logs[ OK ]
* Starting D-Bus system message bus[ OK ]
* Starting SystemD login management service[ OK ]
* Starting Bridge file events into upstart[ OK ]
* Starting system logging daemon[ OK ]
* Starting early crypto disks...
[ OK ]
* Starting Handle applying cloud-config[ OK ]
Skipping profile in /etc/apparmor.d/disable/
* Starting AppArmor profiles
[ OK ]
* Stopping System V initialisation compatibility[ OK ]
* Starting System V runlevel compatibility[ OK ]
* Starting save kernel messages[ OK ]
* Starting configure network device security[ OK ]
* Starting OpenSSH server[ OK ]
* Starting ACPI daemon[ OK ]
* Starting regular background program processing daemon[ OK ]
* Starting deferred execution scheduler[ OK ]
* Stopping save kernel messages[ OK ]
* Starting CPU interrupts balancing daemon[ OK ]
* Starting configure virtual network devices[ OK ]
* Starting automatic crash reporting[ OK ]
Cloud-init v. 0.7.5 running'
```

Authentication Required

http://loanlogiscott.info requires a username and password.  
Your connection to this site is not private.

User Name:

Password:

**Potential breaking attempt!**

**please call:**

**+1-866-793-2591**





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# Growth of 200%



The screenshot shows the top of an Ars Technica article. The header includes the 'ars technica' logo and navigation links for 'MAIN MENU', 'MY STORIES: 25', 'FORUMS', 'SUBSCRIBE', 'JOBS', and 'ARS CONSORTIUM'. The article title is 'A neverending story: PC users lose another \$120M to tech support scams', with a sub-headline 'Court stops alleged scamming operations, but an end to the problem is elusive.' The author is 'Jon Brodtkin' and the date is 'Nov 19, 2014 2:33pm EST'. There are social media share buttons for Facebook and Twitter, and a '70' comment count. Below the text is a photograph of a red rotary telephone inside a metal cage with sharp teeth, symbolizing a scam.




The screenshot shows a news article header with a red background and the word 'NEWS' in white. Below the header is a navigation bar with links for 'Home', 'Video', 'World', 'US & Canada', 'UK', 'Business', 'Tech', and 'Sci'. The article is categorized under 'Technology'. The main title is 'Microsoft takes on tech support scammers'. Below the title, it shows the date '19 December 2014' and the category 'Technology'.



The screenshot shows a Network World article header with the logo 'NETWORKWORLD FROM IDG'. Below the header is a navigation bar with links for 'Home' and 'Security'. The article is written by 'LAYER 8' by Michael Cooney, an Online News Editor. There is an 'About' link and a brief bio: 'Layer 8 is written by Michael Cooney, an editor with Network World.' The article title is 'FTC takes out "tech support" scammers; \$5.1 million in fines, retribution', with the sub-headline 'Fraudsters masqueraded as Dell, Microsoft, McAfee, Norton and others'.



# Growth of 200%



ars technica


MAIN MENU | MY STORIES: 25 | FORUMS | SUBSCRIBE | JOBS | ARS CONSORTIUM

## A never-ending story of tech support scams

### \$120M to tech support



Court stops alleged scamming operations

by Jon Brodtkin - Nov 19, 2014 2:33pm EST



Tech support scams

Symantec Report (2016)



## NEWS

Home | Video | World | US & Canada | UK | Business | Tech | Science

### Technology

## FTC takes out "tech support" scammers; \$5.1 million in fines, retribution

Fraudsters masqueraded as Dell, Microsoft, McAfee, Norton and others

Layer 8 is written by Michael Cooney, an editor with Network World.




# Research Goals

- Systematic study of Tech Support Scam ecosystem
- To investigate the:
  - Prevalence
    - # Domains, # Phone Numbers, and #Scam Campaigns
  - Details about the underlying infrastructure
    - Hosting providers, ASes, and Telecommunication companies
  - Evasion and social engineering techniques
    - Tools used, call-center infrastructures, and prices

# Tool Design (Robovic)

# Data Collection Methodology





- Over 8 months
  - Crawled 8 Million domains
  - Resolved 5 Million domains
  - Detected 22,000 scam URLs
  - Extracted 8,600 unique scam domains
  - 1500 phone numbers

## Short and readable domains

- computer-warning-message[.]com
- donotclose[.]website
- input-error[.]net


## Long with readable parts

- 10.computerhaveaseriousproblempleasecallon18776431254tollfree.yourcomputerhaveaseriousproblempleasecallon18776431254tollfree.yourcomputerhaveaseriousproblempleasecallon18776431254tollfree.browsersecurity16[.]club

## URLs from CDNs

- 1073964613.rsc.cdn77[.]org
- 924983738.r.cdnsun[.]net

# Weekly Scam Domains




# Scam Domains & phone Numbers

- Hiding backend servers (16% used Cloudflare)
- Anonymized registration information (55%)
- Abuse a small number of Telco companies
  - 80% of numbers belong to Twilio, RingRevenue (Invoca), WiTel
  - Prefer those that provide APIs
    - Scalable solution for the scammers' business
- Number of phone numbers is much less than the number of domains
  - Phone numbers can link together domains of the same campaign




# Scam Campaigns




- Phone Number
- Domain Name



# Scam Campaigns




# Life time of Campaigns






# Phone-TLD+I Relationship



# Pay Per Call Marketing





# Meeting the Scammers

- Obtained permission from our IRB
- 60 interactions with the scammers
- Environment:
  - Artificially aged Windows 7 virtual machine
  - Tunneling the traffic through VPN
  - VoIP software with believable CallerID
  - Capturing network traffic, recording the screen and conversations




# Scammers' Tools & Techniques




- Stopped Services/Drivers
- Event Viewer
- Specific Virus Explained
- System Information
- Action Center
- Fake CMD Scan
- Netstat Scan
- Installed/Running Programs
- Browsing History/Settings
- Downloaded Scanner
- Reliability/Performance
- Other (Temp, Registry)

## Social Engineering Techniques



# Scammer Physical Locations & Profit

# Location of Scammers' Servers



# Location of Call Centers



- Monitoring Traffic of Scam Servers:
  - Misconfiguration of scam servers revealed their traffic
    - 142 scam domains were found which had misconfiguration
    - We monitored misconfigured servers every one minute over two months
  - Total visits : 1.7 million unique IPs
  - Max #visitors/domain : 138K unique IPs



# Location of Victims



Average price of Tech Support Scam Package (\$290)

\*

Number of Victims (1.7 million unique IPs)

\*

Conversion Rate (2% as a similar scareware)

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
Scammers' profit = ~ \$9.7 million in 2 months

(a lower bound)


# Defense: Sufficiency of Current Blacklists

# Blacklists: Phone Numbers

	Database	Coverage	Claimed Size
Website	mrnumber.com	19.9%	1.5 billion numbers
	800notes.com	18.5%	Unknown
	numberguru.com	1.0%	29 million lookups
	badnumbers.info	0.2%	968,639 complains
	callersmart.com	0.1%	5.9 million lookups
	scamnumbers.info	0.1%	31,162 numbers
Mobile App	Should I Answer?	0.5%	640 million lookups
	Truecaller	0.5%	2 billion numbers
	Hiya	0.3%	100 million numbers
	CallDetector	0.1%	100,000 complaints monthly
	Mr. Number	0.1%	1.5 billion numbers
	<b>Together</b>	<b>27.4%</b>	-







6 Blacklists (370K domains and IP addresses Together)

- hpHosts
- SANS suspicious domains
- malwaredomains
- malwaredomainlist
- Malc0de database
- abuse.ch

# Why do blacklists not work?

- Tech Support Scams are highly dynamic
  - 30% of the domains are alive less than a day
  - Abusing CDNs to get fresh URLs
  - Majority of phone numbers registered recently
  - Phone numbers are generated dynamically

# Defense against Tech Support Scam

- User Education
  - Explaining the concept of technical support scams is easier
  - Raising awareness through public services
- Browser Support
  - Average users do not know how to kill the browser process and clearing recent history
  - One universal shortcut to close unsafe pages





- Tech support scams pose a serious threat
- We conducted the first systematic study of tech support scams
- Reported prevalence of the scam and evasion techniques based on the collected corpus of thousands of domains and phone numbers
- Clustered campaigns and estimated their life time
- Interacted with 60 different scammers and identified the social engineering techniques
- Underline the need for user education and support from the browser vendors



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# Dial One for Scam: A Large-Scale Analysis of Technical Support Scams

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*Abstract*—In technical support scams, cybercriminals attempt to convince users that their machines are infected with malware and are in need of their technical support. In this process, the victims are asked to provide scammers with remote access to their machines, who will then “diagnose the problem”, before offering their support services which typically cost hundreds of dollars. Despite their conceptual simplicity, technical support scams are responsible for yearly losses of tens of millions of dollars from

Even though this type of scam costs users millions of dollars on a yearly basis [1], [2], there has been no systematic study of technical support scams from the security community. Thus, while today we know that these scams do in fact take place and that scammers are successfully defrauding users, any details about their operations are collected in an unsystematic way, e.g., by victimized users recalling their experiences, and