

Cracking Android Pattern Lock in 5 Attempts

Guixin Ye




Northwest University (China), Lancaster University (UK), Bath University (UK)

Attacking Scenario






How can Bob bypass pattern lock?



Bob only need to observe the fingertip movement!




Evil Bob films how Alice draws the pattern from a distance of 2-3 meters. No need to see the screen content.



Tracking


Bob marks two areas of interest, and runs a vision algorithm to track the fingertip movement.


Tracking Example




Resulted fingertip movement trajectory

View Transformation






Trajectory to Candidate Patterns




A large number of possibilities




Fingertip Trajectory

Possible Patterns (>100)


Use Geometric information




Example: Identify Candidate Patterns



Test on Alice's Phone



Another Example



Evaluation Setup



120 patterns from 215 users

plus

some of the most complex patterns




Other pattern grids


Xiaomi MI4, Meizu2, Huawei Honor7, Samsung Note4




Example Patterns



Simple




Medium




Complex

Complex patterns are less secure




Over 95% of the patterns can be cracked in 5 attempts

Up to 5 candidate patterns generated




For most median and all complex patterns, our system produces just ONE candidate pattern.


Threat distance reaches 2.5m



Over 80% of the patterns can be cracked within a distance of 2.5 meters away from the target device.

More dots helps, but only for simple patterns







Conclusions

Pattern lock is vulnerable under video based attacks

Complex patterns could be less secure

Data available at:

https://dx.doi.org/10.17635/lancaster/researchdata/113

Back Up

Related work

Camera Shake

How to identify candidate pattern


How to define the complexity of pattern lock

Video recording devices

Existing Researches on Pattern Lock



Smudge Attack




Wireless-based Attack

Video-based Attacks on PIN- or text-based passwords





Text-based: Directly facing the keyboard or the screen








PIN-based: The dynamics of hand during typing

Pattern Lock v.s. PIN- or text-based password

How to map the fingertip movements to a graphical structure?
Existing attacks methods cannot be used to crack pattern lock

How can the algorithm adapt to the different size of pattern grid Ovenapping lines Dillerent size of pattern grid


Camera Shake Effect




Camera Shake Calibration















50

w/ camera shake calibration




Solution: Identify Candidate Patterns



- *L* is the collection of the relative line segments.
- D is collection of the directions corresponding to the line segment.

Example: Extracting Geometric Features


Length Feature



 $L:(l_{ST_1},l_{T_1T_2},l_{T_2E})$


D:(5,11,5)


Direction Feature




Pattern Collection and Category

$$CS \downarrow P = S \downarrow P \times \log \downarrow 2 (L \downarrow P + I \downarrow P + O \downarrow P)$$







- ✓ SIP is the number of connected dots
- ✓ LUP is the total length of all line segments that form the pattern
- ✓ *IVP* are the number of intersections
- ✓ OLP are the number of overlapping linear segments

- ✓ Simple pattern (40) : $SIP \in [6.34,19)$
- ✓ Median Pattern (40) : *S\lambda* P ∈ [19,33)
- ✓ Complex pattern $(40): SIP \in [33,46.8)$

Video Recording

User Participation

10 postgraduate: 5 male and 5 female students

Test Phones

Size Brands	Xiaomi	Huawei	Samsung
	MI4	Honor7	Note4
Height(cm)×Height(cm)	13.9×6.9	14.3×7.2	15.4×7.9

Record Device

Apple iPhone4S, Xiaomi MI4 and Meizu2

