

# **Towards Implicit Visual Memory-Based Authentication**

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## **Types of Authentication**


Competing requirements of security and usability. [1]

#### **Common Factors:**

- 1) Knowledge (Password, PIN)
- 2) Biometrics (Fingerprint, Face)
- 3) Possession (Token)

#### Reinforced by:

- 2-Factor Authentication
- Risk-based Authentication
- Continuous Authentication




### **Knowledge-based Authentication**

#### **Example: Passwords**

- 1) Create a secure password
- 2) Remember the password
- 3) Provide at time of authentication

All steps involved are hard for users.

- → High cognitive burden
- → Password reuse
- → Password resets




#### **Fallback Authentication**

Used to regain access if the primary means of authentication is lost!

#### **Different:**

- Memorability
- Rate limiting
- Time required to authenticate
- → Often the weakest link in the chain (Sarah Palin, Mat Honan, ...)
- → We need to design better systems!



## **Let's Play**



Before we start, a short game.






# **Bells**




# **Bells**















### **Mooney Images**

Thresholded two-tone images showing a single object.

#### Recognition:

- Hard to recognize at first sight
- Sudden recognition (aha! / Eureka-effect)
- Intrinsically / By marking the contour of object / Showing the original image

#### Value for Authentication?

- Trigger brain processes involved in **implicit memory**.




## **Implicit Memory**

Unintentional recollection of information.

Can be observed in *habitual* behavior, i.e., riding a bike, playing an instrument.

We are not aware of the information stored in our memory.

We can trigger the implicit memory by a process called *priming*.



Ludmer et al. Neuron 2011 [3]

### **MooneyAuth**

Relieves users of the cognitive burden of remembering an explicit password.

#### 1) Enrollment / Priming:

- Prime on set of random Mooney images.
- We show every image twice.







- Primed + non-primed Mooney images are presented to the user.
- User is requested to label the images.
- Scoring algorithm based on surprisal of observed events.
- User authenticated: score > threshold.




## **Enrollment / Priming**

- Smooth transition

- Takes 3.5 seconds per image.

- In a user study we primed 10 images



Primed + non-primed images are presented.

#### Task:

User has to label the image

or


skip by pressing the

I don't know

button.

#### **Assumption:**

User labels primed images more often correctly (and faster).



## **Scoring**

- Score derived from the self-information (surprisal) of the observed events.
- There are four events that can occur:

|                   | Correct Label  | Incorrect Label  |
|-------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Primed            | p <sub>i</sub> | 1-p <sub>i</sub> |
| <b>Non-Primed</b> | n <sub>i</sub> | 1-n <sub>i</sub> |

$$I(E_{primed,correct}) = -\log_2 P(correct \mid primed)$$

→ A "good" Mooney image has a high p<sub>i</sub>, but low n<sub>i</sub> value.


#### **Attacker Model**

The security does not rely on secrecy of the hidden object.

We provide the attacker with the solution for every Mooney image:

- Mooney image
- Original grayscale image
- Correct label

The scheme can not be broken by computer vision algorithms!



#### **Attacker Model**

**Secret:** Knowing which images the user was primed on.

During enrollment images are selected by the server:

- No user selection bias
- Random guessing
- Rate limit guessing attempts



#### **Main Results**

Does implicit memory-based authentication work?

#### **User Studies**

#### **Pre Study**

230 participants20 days

#### Goals:

- Get p<sub>i</sub>, n<sub>i</sub> for Scoring
- Test Label Matching

#### **Long-Term Study**

~130 participants 8.5 moths

#### Goals:

- Long-Term Effects


#### Main Study

70 participants 21 days


#### Goals:

- Performance Measure

Previous Work




## Our Result




### **Long-Term Results**

How long does the priming last?


## **Priming Effect Decline Over Time:**



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#### **Benefits and Limitations**

#### **Benefits:**

- High memorability
- Server selected secret (no user bias)

#### **Limitations:**

- Cumbersome to label (software keyboard, time required)
- Unexplored: Interference effects (use for multiple services)
- Phishing
- Shoulder surfing
- Secure storage of secret








# Let's Play Again!



Back to the game.














**Elephant** 



## **Takeaway**







# Demo? mooneyauth.org

### **Mooney Image Generation**

- Image search with nouns from "MRC Psycholinguistic Database".
- 2) Convert images to gray-scale.
- 3) Smoothing via Gaussian filter.
- 4) Otsu's histogram based thresholding algorithm.
- 5) Filter for mean recognition rate of 5 sec. and longer. [5]

