RAINBOW: A Robust And Invisible Non-Blind Watermark for Network Flows

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
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Traffic analysis


Low-latency traffic analysis

- Intrusion detection
- Compromising anonymous networks

Stepping stone detection



Compromising Anonymity




Traffic analysis


Passive


- Analyzing original packet counts, timing, ...
- Common Problem: low efficiency
 - □ Slow decision (not real time), high false errors, ...
- Active (watermarking)
 - Motivation: improve efficiency
 - Using modified packet timing, count, rate, ...
 - Multimedia watermarking: QIM, Patchwork, ...

Stepping stone detection




Compromising Anonymity





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
Motivation of RAINBOW

- □ Watermarking: efficient detection
- Common Problem with watermarking
 - Blind: Lack of Invisibility
 - Legitimate-user disturbance
 - Subject to attacks
- Non-Blind: in middle of passive schemes and active blind schemes
- **Robust** to network perturbations

Robust and Invisible Non-Blind Watermark RAINBOW

Watermark Insertion


Uses Inter-Packet Delay (IPD) information for watermarking



Based on spread spectrum multimedia watermarking

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□ Post_IPD(t^w)=Pre_IPD(t^u) +Wm □ Recv_IPD(t^r)-Pre_IPD(t^u)=Wm+Jitter



Insertion scheme

IPD database

For new flows, watermarker creates an entry in database


- Last N packets
- Update during time
- Entry is removed from database, after connection ends

Resources

Memory: 3.1 MB for an institution with 400 members

Detection scheme

- Use last N samples of received flow
- Recv_IPD Pre_IPD = Wm + Net_Jitter
 - Detection of spread spectrum signal
- □ Network jitter model: Laplacian $Lap(O, b_{\delta})$
 - Normalized Correlation is an efficient detection rule
- Decision based on threshold




System analysis


- Model system
 - I Jitter $\delta \propto Lap(0, b_{\delta})$
 - IPDs: exponential

SNR
$$\gamma = \frac{a}{\sqrt{2}b_{\delta}}$$
a: watermark amplitudeHypothesis testingTrue detection $T_1 \propto Lap(\gamma, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2N}})$ False detection $T_0 \propto Lap(0, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2N}})$






MinMax analysis




Implementations


PlanetLab infrastructure Larger jitter than normal traffic SSH traffic

Implementation results




Implementation results





Practical COER




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Selective correlation

Sources of flow modification

- Protocol specific causes: duplicated, retransmitted, re-packetized, ...
- Protocol specific packets: TCP ACK/SYN, SSH initial packets, ...
- Initial delay
- Matching block
 - Sliding windows

Implementation



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Invisibility

- Using Non-blind spread spectrum watermark we expect high invisibility
- Confirmed through informationtheoretic tools:
 - Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
 98% confidence
 - Entropy-based tools of Giavencchio for covert channels (CCS'07)

Performance comparison


- Run time: 0.4 microsec for 400 connections with 5000 packets
- Detection time: about 3 min (400 packets)
- □ False errors of order 10⁻⁶
 - Passive schemes: 10⁻²
 - Blind watermarks: at most 10⁻⁵
- Invisibility

Conclusions


- □ RAINBOW: A novel traffic analysis
 - In between of passive and blind active
- High Detection Efficiency
- Invisibility
- Robustness to flow modifications
- Future work: Use fast coding tools to insert watermarks more efficiently
 - Effective semi-blind or blind schemes

Thanks


Implementation results



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Neyman-Pearson analysis



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