Practical Issues with TLS Client Certificate Authentication

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Supported by all major browsers!

TLS Client Certificate Authentication



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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- No trusted third party required (!)

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  - Required to authorize online banking transactions >200 EUR

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- 18% do not perform revocation checks

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- Provide better CCA audit trail

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