



Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification

Byoungyoung Lee, Chengyu Song, Yeongjin Jang Tielei Wang, Taesoo Kim, Long Lu, Wenke Lee


> Georgia Institute of Technology Stony Brook University




Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends, Microsoft, 2013




Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends, Microsoft, 2013



Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends, Microsoft, 2013



The number of reported vulnerabilities in Chrome (2011-2013)



The number of reported vulnerabilities in Chrome (2011-2013)

Use-after-free

• A dangling pointer

A pointer points to a freed memory region

- Using a dangling pointer leads to undefined program states
 - Easy to achieve arbitrary code executions
 - so called use-after-free


```
class Doc : public Element {
    // ...
    Element *child;
};
class Body : public Element {
    // ...
    Element *child;
};
```

```
Doc *doc = new Doc();
Body *body = new Body();
```

```
doc->child = body;
```

```
delete body;
```

```
if (doc->child)
    doc->child->getAlign();
```



Allocate objects


Doc *doc = **new** Doc(); Body *body = **new** Body();

doc->child = body;

delete body;

if (doc->child)
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Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification




Allocate objects

Doc *doc = **new** Doc(); Body *body = **new** Body();

Propagate pointers doc->child = body;

delete body;




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


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Doc *doc = **new** Doc(); Body *body = **new** Body();

Propagate pointers doc->child = body;

Free an object delete body;




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


Allocate objects

Doc *doc = **new** Doc(); Body *body = **new** Body();

Propagate pointers doc->child = body;

Free an object delete body;




Allocate objects

Doc *doc = **new** Doc(); Body *body = **new** Body();

Propagate pointers doc->child = body;

Free an object delete body;

Use a dangling pointer if (doc->child) doc->child->getAlign();




Allocate objects

Doc *doc = **new** Doc(); Body *body = **new** Body();

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Free an object delete body;

Use a dangling pointer if (doc->child) doc->child->getAlign();



Allocate objects


Doc *doc = new Doc();	
Body *body = new Body()	;

Propagate pointers doc->child = body;


Free an object delete body;

Use a dangling pointer if (doc->child) doc->child->getAlign();

Related Work on Use-after-free




Related Work on Use-after-free



Preventing Use-arter-free with Danging Pointers Numincation

Related Work on Use-after-free




Preventing ose-arter-free with Danging Pointers Numication

DangNull: Use-after-free detector


- Tracking Object Relationships
 - Coarse grained pointer semantic tracking
 - ➔ Support large-scale software
- Nullify dangling pointers
 - Immediately eliminate all dangling pointers
 - \rightarrow Non-bypassable to sophisticated attacks

- Intercept allocations/deallocations in runtime
 - Maintain Shadow Object Tree
 - Red-Black tree to efficiently keep object layout information
 - Node: (base address, size) pair




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
Doc *doc = **new** Doc();



- Intercept allocations/deallocations in runtime
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


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




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


- Instrument pointer propagations
 - Maintain backward/forward pointer trees for a shadow obj.




- Instrument pointer propagations
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
```
doc->child = body;
trace(&doc->child, body);
```




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Shadow obj. of Doc




Shadow obj. of Body




Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification

- Instrument pointer propagations
 - Maintain backward/forward pointer trees for a shadow obj.




Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification

- Instrument pointer propagations
 - Maintain backward/forward pointer trees for a shadow obj.



- Instrument pointer propagations
 - Maintain backward/forward pointer trees for a shadow obj.




This is coarse grained pointer semantic tracking, but enough to identify all dangling pointers.





Nullifying Dangling Pointers

- Nullify all backward pointers of Body, once it is deleted.
 - All backward pointers of Body are dangling pointers
 - Dangling pointers have no semantics



Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification

Nullifying Dangling Pointers

delete body;

Nullification

doc->child = NULL

if (doc->child)
 doc->child->getAlign();

Null-dereference is safely contained in pre-mapped nullpadding

Nullifying Dangling Pointers

delete body;

Immediately eliminate all dangling pointers!

if (doc->child)
 doc->child->getAlign();

Null-dereference is safely contained in pre-mapped nullpadding

Implementation

- Prototype DangNull
 - Instrumentation: LLVM pass, +389 LoC
 - Runtime: compiler-rt, +3,955 LoC

- To build target applications,
 - SPEC CPU 2006: one extra compiler and linker flag
 - Chromium: +27 LoC to .gyp build configuration file

Performance Evaluation

- Chromium browser
 - Instrumented 140k/16,831k (0.8%) instructions
 - Passed all unit tests and layout tests
 - Overall 28.9% overheads on various benchmarks
 - A page loading time for the Alexa top 100 websites
 - 7% increased load time
 - While visiting http://google.com,
 - 123k shadow objects and 32k shadow pointers
 - 7k nullifications

Conclusion

• Presented DangNull, which detects use-after-free

• Supporting large-scale software

• Non-bypassable to sophisticated attacks

Demo

- Running Chromium browser (version 29.0.1547.65)
 - -Hardened using DangNull
 - Testing use-after-free exploit (PoC)
 - CVE-2013-2909: Heap-use-after-free in

WebCore::RenderBlock::determineStartPosition