Aditya Sirish A Yelgundhalli (New York University), Patrick Zielinski (New York University), Reza Curtmola (New Jersey Institute of Technology), Justin Cappos (New York University)

Git is the most popular version control system today, with Git forges such as
GitHub, GitLab, and Bitbucket used to add functionality. Significantly, these
forges are used to enforce security controls. However, due to the lack of an
open protocol for ensuring a repository's integrity, forges cannot prove
themselves to be trustworthy, and have to carry the responsibility of being
non-verifiable trusted third parties in modern software supply chains.

In this paper, we present textbf{gittuf}, a system that decentralizes Git
security and enables every user to contribute to collectively enforcing the
repository's security. First, gittuf enables distributing of policy
declaration and management responsibilities among more parties such that no
single user is trusted entirely or unilaterally. Second, gittuf decentralizes
the tracking of repository activity, ensuring that a single entity cannot
manipulate repository events. Third, gittuf decentralizes policy enforcement
by enabling all developers to independently verify the policy, eliminating the
single point of trust placed in the forge as the only arbiter for whether a
change in the repository is authorized. Thus, gittuf can provide strong
security guarantees in the event of a compromise of the centralized forge, the
underlying infrastructure, or a subset of privileged developers trusted to set
policy. gittuf also implements policy features that can protect against
unauthorized changes to branches and tags (emph{i.e.}, pushes) as well as
files/folders (emph{i.e.}, commits). Our analysis of gittuf shows that its
properties and policy features provide protections against previously seen
version control system attacks. In addition, our evaluation of gittuf shows it
is viable even for large repositories with a high volume of activity such as
those of Git and Kubernetes (less than 4% storage overhead and under 0.59s of
time to verify each push).

Currently, gittuf is an OpenSSF sandbox project hosted by the Linux
Foundation. gittuf is being used in projects hosted by the OpenSSF and the
CNCF, and an enterprise pilot at Bloomberg is underway.

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