Thijs van Ede (University of Twente), Riccardo Bortolameotti (Bitdefender), Andrea Continella (UC Santa Barbara), Jingjing Ren (Northeastern University), Daniel J. Dubois (Northeastern University), Martina Lindorfer (TU Wien), David Choffnes (Northeastern University), Maarten van Steen (University of Twente), Andreas Peter (University of Twente)

Mobile-application fingerprinting of network traffic is a valuable tool for many security solutions as it provides insights into the apps active on a network.
Unfortunately, existing techniques require prior knowledge of apps to be able to recognize them.
However, mobile environments are constantly evolving, i.e., apps are regularly installed, updated, and uninstalled.
Therefore, it is infeasible for existing fingerprinting approaches to cover all apps that may appear on a network.
Moreover, most mobile traffic is encrypted, shows similarities with other apps, e.g., due to common libraries or the use of content delivery networks, and depends on user input, further complicating the fingerprinting process.

As a solution, we propose FlowPrint, an unsupervised approach for creating mobile app fingerprints from (encrypted) network traffic.
We automatically find temporal correlations among destination-related features of network traffic and use these correlations to generate app fingerprints.
As this approach is unsupervised, we are able to fingerprint previously unseen apps, something that existing techniques fail to achieve.
We evaluate our approach for both Android and iOS in the setting of app recognition where we achieve an accuracy of 89.2%, outperforming state-of-the-art solutions by 39.0%.
In addition, we show that our approach can detect previously unseen apps with a precision of 93.5%, detecting 72.3% of apps within the first five minutes of communication.

View More Papers

Decentralized Control: A Case Study of Russia

Reethika Ramesh (University of Michigan), Ram Sundara Raman (University of Michgan), Matthew Bernhard (University of Michigan), Victor Ongkowijaya (University of Michigan), Leonid Evdokimov (Independent), Anne Edmundson (Independent), Steven Sprecher (University of Michigan), Muhammad Ikram (Macquarie University), Roya Ensafi (University of Michigan)

Read More

Designing a Better Browser for Tor with BLAST

Tao Wang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Read More

SymTCP: Eluding Stateful Deep Packet Inspection with Automated Discrepancy...

Zhongjie Wang (University of California, Riverside), Shitong Zhu (University of California, Riverside), Yue Cao (University of California, Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (University of California, Riverside), Chengyu Song (University of California, Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (University of California, Riverside), Kevin S. Chan (U.S. Army Research Lab), Tracy D. Braun (U.S. Army Research Lab)

Read More

Compliance Cautions: Investigating Security Issues Associated with U.S. Digital-Security...

Rock Stevens (University of Maryland), Josiah Dykstra (Independent Security Researcher), Wendy Knox Everette (Leviathan Security Group), James Chapman (Independent Security Researcher), Garrett Bladow (Dragos), Alexander Farmer (Independent Security Researcher), Kevin Halliday (University of Maryland), Michelle L. Mazurek (University of Maryland)

Read More