Tomer Schwartz (Data and Security Laboratory Fujitsu Research of Europe Ltd), Ofir Manor (Data and Security Laboratory Fujitsu Research of Europe Ltd), Andikan Otung (Data and Security Laboratory Fujitsu Research of Europe Ltd)

Cyber attacks and fraud pose significant risks to online platforms, with malicious actors who often employ VPN servers to conceal their identities and bypass geolocation-based security measures. Current passive VPN detection methods identify VPN connections with more than 95% accuracy, but depend on prior knowledge, such as known VPN to IP mappings and predefined communication patterns. This makes them ineffective against sophisticated attackers who leverage compromised machines as VPN servers. On the other hand, current active detection methods are effective in detecting proxy usage but are mostly ineffective in VPN detection.

This paper introduces SNITCH (Server-side Non-intrusive Identification of Tunneled CHaracteristics), a novel approach designed to enhance web security by identifying VPN use without prior data collection on known VPN servers or utilizing intrusive client-side software. SNITCH combines IP geolocation, ground-truth landmarks, and communication delay measurements to detect VPN activity in real time and seamlessly integrates into the authentication process, preserving user experience while enhancing security. We measured 130 thousand connections from over 24 thousand globally distributed VPN servers and client nodes to validate the feasibility of our solution in the real world. Our experiments revealed that in scenarios where the State of the Art fails to detect, SNITCH achieves a detection accuracy of up to 93%, depending on the geographical region.

View More Papers

coucouArray ( [post_type] => ndss-paper [post_status] => publish [posts_per_page] => 4 [orderby] => rand [tax_query] => Array ( [0] => Array ( [taxonomy] => category [field] => id [terms] => Array ( [0] => 40 [1] => 118 ) ) ) [post__not_in] => Array ( [0] => 20925 ) )

PQConnect: Automated Post-Quantum End-to-End Tunnels

Daniel J. Bernstein (University of Illinois at Chicago and Academia Sinica), Tanja Lange (Eindhoven University of Technology amd Academia Sinica), Jonathan Levin (Academia Sinica and Eindhoven University of Technology), Bo-Yin Yang (Academia Sinica)

Read More

Mixnets on a Tightrope: Quantifying the Leakage of Mix...

Sebastian Meiser, Debajyoti Das, Moritz Kirschte, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Aniket Kate

Read More

Non-intrusive and Unconstrained Keystroke Inference in VR Platforms via...

Tao Ni (City University of Hong Kong), Yuefeng Du (City University of Hong Kong), Qingchuan Zhao (City University of Hong Kong), Cong Wang (City University of Hong Kong)

Read More

On the Robustness of LDP Protocols for Numerical Attributes...

Xiaoguang Li (Xidian University, Purdue University), Zitao Li (Alibaba Group (U.S.) Inc.), Ninghui Li (Purdue University), Wenhai Sun (Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA)

Read More

Privacy Starts with UI: Privacy Patterns and Designer Perspectives in UI/UX Practice

Anxhela Maloku (Technical University of Munich), Alexandra Klymenko (Technical University of Munich), Stephen Meisenbacher (Technical University of Munich), Florian Matthes (Technical University of Munich)

Vision: Profiling Human Attackers: Personality and Behavioral Patterns in Deceptive Multi-Stage CTF Challenges

Khalid Alasiri (School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence Arizona State University), Rakibul Hasan (School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence Arizona State University)

From Underground to Mainstream Marketplaces: Measuring AI-Enabled NSFW Deepfakes on Fiverr

Mohamed Moustafa Dawoud (University of California, Santa Cruz), Alejandro Cuevas (Princeton University), Ram Sundara Raman (University of California, Santa Cruz)