Anis Yusof (NU Singapore)

To improve the preparedness of Security Operation Center (SOC), analysts may leverage provenance graphs to deepen their understanding of existing cyberattacks. However, the unknown nature of a cyberattack may result in a provenance graph with incomplete details, thus limiting the comprehensive knowledge of the cyberattack due to partial indicators. Furthermore, using outdated provenance graphs imposes a limit on the understanding of cyberattack trends. This negatively impacts SOC operations that are responsible for detecting and responding to threats and incidents. This paper introduces PROVCON, a framework that constructs a provenance graph representative of a cyberattack. Based on documented cyberattacks, the framework reproduces the cyberattack and generates the corresponding data for attack analysis. The knowledge gained from existing cyberattacks through the constructed provenance graph is instrumental in enhancing the understanding and improving decision-making in SOC. With the use of PROVCON, SOC can improve its cybersecurity posture by aligning its operations based on insights derived from documented observations.

View More Papers

Defending Against Membership Inference Attacks on Iteratively Pruned Deep...

Jing Shang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jian Wang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Kailun Wang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Jiqiang Liu (Beijing Jiaotong University), Nan Jiang (Beijing University of Technology), Md Armanuzzaman (Northeastern University), Ziming Zhao (Northeastern University)

Read More

Detecting IMSI-Catchers by Characterizing Identity Exposing Messages in Cellular...

Tyler Tucker (University of Florida), Nathaniel Bennett (University of Florida), Martin Kotuliak (ETH Zurich), Simon Erni (ETH Zurich), Srdjan Capkun (ETH Zuerich), Kevin Butler (University of Florida), Patrick Traynor (University of Florida)

Read More

Speak Up, I’m Listening: Extracting Speech from Zero-Permission VR...

Derin Cayir (Florida International University), Reham Mohamed Aburas (American University of Sharjah), Riccardo Lazzeretti (Sapienza University of Rome), Marco Angelini (Link Campus University of Rome), Abbas Acar (Florida International University), Mauro Conti (University of Padua), Z. Berkay Celik (Purdue University), Selcuk Uluagac (Florida International University)

Read More

KernelSnitch: Side Channel-Attacks on Kernel Data Structures

Lukas Maar (Graz University of Technology), Jonas Juffinger (Graz University of Technology), Thomas Steinbauer (Graz University of Technology), Daniel Gruss (Graz University of Technology), Stefan Mangard (Graz University of Technology)

Read More