Sakuna Harinda Jayasundara, Nalin Asanka Gamagedara Arachchilage, Giovanni Russello (University of Auckland)

Access control failures can cause data breaches, putting entire organizations at risk of financial loss and reputation damage. One of the main reasons for such failures is the mistakes made by system administrators when they manually generate low-level access control policies directly from highlevel requirement specifications. Therefore, to help administrators in that policy generation process, previous research proposed graphical policy authoring tools and automated policy generation frameworks. However, in reality, those tools and frameworks are neither usable nor reliable enough to help administrators generate access control policies accurately while avoiding access control failures. Therefore, as a solution, in this paper, we present “AccessFormer”, a novel policy generation framework that improves both the usability and reliability of access control policy generation. Through the proposed framework, on the one hand, we improve the reliability of policy generation by utilizing Language Models (LMs) to generate, verify, and refine access control policies by incorporating the system’s as well as administrator’s feedback. On the other hand, we also improve the usability of the policy generation by proposing a usable policy authoring interface designed to help administrators understand policy generation mistakes and accurately provide feedback.

View More Papers

WIP: Adversarial Object-Evasion Attack Detection in Autonomous Driving Contexts:...

Rao Li (The Pennsylvania State University), Shih-Chieh Dai (Pennsylvania State University), Aiping Xiong (Penn State University)

Read More

Vision: Towards True User-Centric Design for Digital Identity Wallets

Yorick Last (Paderborn University), Patricia Arias Cabarcos (Paderborn University)

Read More

Security Awareness Training through Experiencing the Adversarial Mindset

Jens Christian Dalgaard, Niek A. Janssen, Oksana Kulyuk, Carsten Schurmann (IT University of Copenhagen)

Read More

Certificate Transparency Revisited: The Public Inspections on Third-party Monitors

Aozhuo Sun (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Jingqiang Lin (School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China), Wei Wang (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Zeyan Liu (The University of Kansas), Bingyu Li (School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University), Shushang Wen (School of…

Read More