Song Liao, Jingwen Yan, Long Cheng (Clemson University)

The rapid evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies allows users to interact with devices in a smart home environment. In an effort to strengthen the connectivity of smart devices across diverse vendors, multiple leading device manufacturers developed the Matter standard, enabling users to control devices from different sources seamlessly. However, the interoperability introduced by Matter poses new challenges to user privacy and safety. In this paper, we propose the Hidden Eavesdropping Attack in Matter-enabled smart home systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the Matter device pairing process and delegation phase. Our investigation of the Matter device pairing process reveals the possibility of unauthorized delegation. Furthermore, such delegation can grant unauthorized Matter hubs (i.e., hidden hubs) the capability to eavesdrop on other IoT devices without the awareness of device owners. Meanwhile, the implementation flaws from companies in device management complicate the task of device owners in identifying such hidden hubs. The disclosed sensitive data about devices, such as the status of door locks, can be leveraged by malicious attackers to deduce users’ activities, potentially leading to security breaches and safety issues.

View More Papers

Security-Performance Tradeoff in DAG-based Proof-of-Work Blockchain Protocols

Shichen Wu (1. School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University 2. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education), Puwen Wei (1. School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University 2. Quancheng Laboratory 3. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education), Ren Zhang (Cryptape Co. Ltd. and…

Read More

WIP: Auditing Artist Style Pirate in Text-to-image Generation Models

Linkang Du (Zhejiang University), Zheng Zhu (Zhejiang University), Min Chen (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Shouling Ji (Zhejiang University), Peng Cheng (Zhejiang University), Jiming Chen (Zhejiang University), Zhikun Zhang (Stanford University)

Read More

Vision: “AccessFormer”: Feedback-Driven Access Control Policy

Sakuna Harinda Jayasundara, Nalin Asanka Gamagedara Arachchilage, Giovanni Russello (University of Auckland)

Read More

IRRedicator: Pruning IRR with RPKI-Valid BGP Insights

Minhyeok Kang (Seoul National University), Weitong Li (Virginia Tech), Roland van Rijswijk-Deij (University of Twente), Ted "Taekyoung" Kwon (Seoul National University), Taejoong Chung (Virginia Tech)

Read More