Michele Marazzi, Stefano Longari, Michele Carminati, Stefano Zanero (Politecnico di Milano)

ZOOX AutoDriving Security Award Runner-up!

With the increasing interest in autonomous vehicles (AVs), ensuring their safety and security is becoming crucial. The introduction of advanced features has increased the need for various interfaces to communicate with the external world, creating new potential attack vectors that attackers can exploit to alter sensor data. LiDAR sensors are widely employed to support autonomous driving features and generate point cloud data used by ADAS to 3D map the vehicle’s surroundings. Tampering attacks on LiDAR-generated data can compromise the vehicle’s functionalities and seriously threaten passengers and other road users. Existing approaches to LiDAR data tampering detection show security flaws and can be bypassed by attackers through design vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a novel approach for tampering detection of LiDAR-generated data in AVs, employing a watermarking technique. We validate our approach through experiments to prove its feasibility in realworld time-constrained scenarios and its efficacy in detecting LiDAR tampering attacks. Our approach performs better when compared to the current state-of-the-art LiDAR watermarking techniques while addressing critical issues related to watermark security and imperceptibility.

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Efficient and Timely Revocation of V2X Credentials

Gianluca Scopelliti (Ericsson & KU Leuven), Christoph Baumann (Ericsson), Fritz Alder (KU Leuven), Eddy Truyen (KU Leuven), Jan Tobias Mühlberg (Université libre de Bruxelles & KU Leuven)

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MadRadar: A Black-Box Physical Layer Attack Framework on mmWave...

David Hunt (Duke University), Kristen Angell (Duke University), Zhenzhou Qi (Duke University), Tingjun Chen (Duke University), Miroslav Pajic (Duke University)

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Transforming Raw Authentication Logs into Interpretable Events

Seth Hastings, Tyler Moore, Corey Bolger, Philip Schumway (University of Tulsa)

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BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV Attacks

Cameron Morris (University of Connecticut), Amir Herzberg (University of Connecticut), Bing Wang (University of Connecticut), Samuel Secondo (University of Connecticut)

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