Takami Sato, Ningfei Wang (University of California, Irvine), Yueqiang Cheng (NIO Security Research), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)

Automated Lane Centering (ALC) is one of the most popular autonomous driving (AD) technologies available in many commodity vehicles. ALC can reduce the human driver’s efforts by taking over their steering work. However, recent research alerts that ALC can be vulnerable to off-road attacks that lead victim vehicles out of their driving lane. To be secure against off-road attacks, this paper explores the potential defense capability of low-quality localization and publicly available maps against off-road attacks against autonomous driving. We design the first map-fusion-based off-road attack detection approach, LaneGuard, LaneGuard detects off-road attacks based on the difference between the observed road shape and the driver-predefined route shape. We evaluate LaneGuar on large-scale real-world driving traces consisting of 80 attack scenarios and 11,558 benign scenarios. We find that LaneGuard can achieve an attack detection rate of 89% with a 12% false positive rate. In real-world highway driving experiments, LaneGuard exhibits no false positives while maintaining a near-zero false negative rate against simulated attacks.

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WIP: Practical Removal Attacks on LiDAR-based Object Detection in...

Takami Sato (University of California, Irvine), Yuki Hayakawa (Keio University), Ryo Suzuki (Keio University), Yohsuke Shiiki (Keio University), Kentaro Yoshioka (Keio University), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)

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NODLINK: An Online System for Fine-Grained APT Attack Detection...

Shaofei Li (Key Laboratory of High-Confidence Software Technologies (MOE), School of Computer Science, Peking University), Feng Dong (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Xusheng Xiao (Arizona State University), Haoyu Wang (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Fei Shao (Case Western Reserve University), Jiedong Chen (Sangfor Technologies Inc.), Yao Guo (Key Laboratory of High-Confidence Software Technologies…

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WIP: An Adaptive High Frequency Removal Attack to Bypass...

Yuki Hayakawa (Keio University), Takami Sato (University of California, Irvine), Ryo Suzuki, Kazuma Ikeda, Ozora Sako, Rokuto Nagata (Keio University), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine), Kentaro Yoshioka (Keio University)

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