Benjamin Cyr and Yan Long (University of Michigan), Takeshi Sugawara (The University of Electro-Communications), Kevin Fu (Northeastern University)

The private sector and even hobbyists are increasingly launching smaller satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, including semiconductors for inertial measurement and other sensing, significantly reduce deployment costs. Such improvements, however, also increase the risk of satellite sensor spoofing attacks, including analog signal injection. Sensor spoofing attacks could compromise the integrity of satellites' onboard sensors, leading to mission-catastrophic kinetic actions. Based on conventional laser jamming and damaging attacks as well as the recent research discoveries on sensor spoofing attacks against terrestrial systems, this position paper (1) shares our views on open technical problems for protecting space systems from analog sensor integrity vulnerabilities, and (2) discusses future challenges of building experimental methodologies, simulations, and evaluation test beds.

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CLExtract: Recovering Highly Corrupted DVB/GSE Satellite Stream with Contrastive...

Minghao Lin (University of Colorado Boulder), Minghao Cheng (Independent Researcher), Dongsheng Luo (Florida International University), Yueqi Chen (University of Colorado Boulder) Presenter: Minghao Lin

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Efficient Privacy-Preserved Processing of Multimodal Data for Vehicular Traffic...

Meisam Mohammady (Iowa State University), Reza Arablouei (Data61, CSIRO)

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The “Beatrix” Resurrections: Robust Backdoor Detection via Gram Matrices

Wanlun Ma (Swinburne University of Technology), Derui Wang (CSIRO’s Data61), Ruoxi Sun (The University of Adelaide & CSIRO's Data61), Minhui Xue (CSIRO's Data61), Sheng Wen (Swinburne University of Technology), Yang Xiang (Digital Research & Innovation Capability Platform, Swinburne University of Technology)

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