Alireza Mohammadi (University of Michigan-Dearborn) and Hafiz Malik (University of Michigan-Dearborn)

Motivated by ample evidence in the automotive cybersecurity literature that the car brake ECUs can be maliciously reprogrammed, it has been shown that an adversary who can directly control the frictional brake actuators can induce wheel lockup conditions despite having a limited knowledge of the tire-road interaction characteristics. In this paper, we investigate the destabilizing effect of such wheel lockup attacks on the lateral motion stability of vehicles from a robust stability perspective. Furthermore, we propose a quadratic programming (QP) problem that the adversary can solve for finding the optimal destabilizing longitudinal slip reference values.

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What the Fork? Finding and Analyzing Malware in GitHub...

Alan Cao (New York University) and Brendan Dolan-Gavitt (New York University)

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Demo #2: Sequential Attacks on Kalman Filter-Based Forward Collision...

Yuzhe Ma, Jon Sharp, Ruizhe Wang, Earlence Fernandes, and Jerry Zhu (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

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P4DDPI: Securing P4-Programmable Data Plane Networks via DNS Deep...

Ali AlSabeh (University of South Carolina), Elie Kfoury (University of South Carolina), Jorge Crichigno (University of South Carolina) and Elias Bou-Harb (University of Texas at San Antonio)

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(Short) WIP: Deployability Improvement, Stealthiness User Study, and Safety...

Takami Sato, Junjie Shen, Ningfei Wang (UC Irvine), Yunhan Jia (ByteDance), Xue Lin (Northeastern University), and Qi Alfred Chen (UC Irvine)

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