Alan Cao (New York University) and Brendan Dolan-Gavitt (New York University)

On GitHub, open-source developers use the fork feature to create server-side clones and implement code changes separately before creating pull requests. However, such fork repositories can be abused to store and distribute malware, particularly malware that stealthily mines cryptocurrencies.

In this paper, we present an analysis of this emerging attack vector and a system for catching malware in GitHub fork repositories with minimal human effort called Fork Integrity Analysis, implemented through a detection infrastructure called Fork Sentry. By automatically detecting and reverse engineering interesting artifacts extracted from a given repository’s forks, we can generate alerts for suspicious artifacts, and provide a means for takedown by GitHub Trust & Safety. We demonstrate the efficacy of our techniques by scanning 68,879 forks of 35 popular cryptocurrency repositories, leading to the discovery of 26 forked repositories that were hosting malware, and report them to GitHub with seven successful takedowns so far. Our detection infrastructure allows not only for the triaging and alerting of suspicious forks, but also provides continuous monitoring for later potential malicious forks. The code and collected data from Fork Sentry will be released as an open-source project.

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Forensic Analysis of Configuration-based Attacks

Muhammad Adil Inam (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Wajih Ul Hassan (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Ali Ahad (University of Virginia), Adam Bates (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Rashid Tahir (University of Prince Mugrin), Tianyin Xu (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Fareed Zaffar (LUMS)

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Demo #8: Identifying Drones Based on Visual Tokens

Ben Nassi (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Elad Feldman (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Aviel Levy (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Yaron Pirutin (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Asaf Shabtai (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Ryusuke Masuoka (Fujitsu System Integration Laboratories) and Yuval Elovici (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

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GhostTalk: Interactive Attack on Smartphone Voice System Through Power...

Yuanda Wang (Michigan State University), Hanqing Guo (Michigan State University), Qiben Yan (Michigan State University)

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