Gedare Bloom (University of Colorado Colorado Springs)

Best Paper Award Winner ($300 cash prize)!

The controller area network (CAN) is a high-value asset to defend and attack in automobiles. The bus-off attack exploits CAN’s fault confinement to force a victim electronic control unit (ECU) into the bus-off state, which prevents it from using the bus. Although pernicious, the bus-off attack has two distinct phases that are observable on the bus and allow the attack to be detected and prevented. In this paper we present WeepingCAN, a refinement of the bus-off attack that is stealthy and can escape detection. We evaluate WeepingCAN experimentally using realistic CAN benchmarks and find it succeeds in over 75% of attempts without exhibiting the detectable features of the original attack. We demonstrate WeepingCAN on a real vehicle.

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ROV++: Improved Deployable Defense against BGP Hijacking

Reynaldo Morillo (University of Connecticut), Justin Furuness (University of Connecticut), Cameron Morris (University of Connecticut), James Breslin (University of Connecticut), Amir Herzberg (University of Connecticut), Bing Wang (University of Connecticut)

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Demo #2: Sequential Attacks on Kalman Filter-Based Forward Collision...

Yuzhe Ma, Jon Sharp, Ruizhe Wang, Earlence Fernandes, and Jerry Zhu (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

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MUVIDS: False MAVLink Injection Attack Detection in Communication for...

Seonghoon Jeong, Eunji Park, Kang Uk Seo, Jeong Do Yoo, and Huy Kang Kim (Korea University)

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When DNS Goes Dark: Understanding Privacy and Shaping Policy...

Vijay k. Gurbani and Cynthia Hood ( Illinois Institute of Technology), Anita Nikolich (University of Illinois), Henning Schulzrinne (Columbia University) and Radu State (University of Luxembourg)

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