Hexuan Yu (Virginia Tech), Chaoyu Zhang (Virginia Tech), Yang Xiao (University of Kentucky), Angelos D. Keromytis (Georgia Institute of Technology), Y. Thomas Hou (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Wenjing Lou (Virginia Tech)

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are known to leak or sell subscribers’ sensitive information, including geolocation and communication histories. Anonymous mobile user authentication methods, such as cite{schmitt2021pretty} (USENIX Sec'21),~cite{yu2023aaka} (NDSS'24), cite{alnashwan2024strong} (CCS'24), enable users to access mobile networks without revealing long-term identifiers like phone numbers or Subscription Permanent Identifiers (SUPI). However, the absence of identity transparency and location awareness poses significant challenges to implementing anonymous access in real-world mobile networks, particularly for essential functions such as call routing, usage measurement, and charging. To address these limitations, we propose ANONYCALL, a privacy-preserving call management architecture that supports anonymous mobile network access while enabling two essential functions: textit{anonymous callee discovery} and textit{usage-based charging}. ANONYCALL incorporates an out-of-band authentication mechanism to securely share temporary call identifiers, allowing seamless call routing without revealing permanent user information. Additionally, it introduces an anonymous but accountable balance credential that enables accurate charging and prevents double-spending while preserving mobile user anonymity. Fully compatible with existing mobile networks, ANONYCALL introduces minimal overhead, adding less than 200 ms to call establishment. Evaluations with smartphones and standard calling systems demonstrate its practicality, offering a viable solution for privacy-preserving yet functional mobile communication.

View More Papers

Actively Understanding the Dynamics and Risks of the Threat...

Tillson Galloway (Georgia Institute of Technology), Omar Alrawi (Georgia Institute of Technology), Allen Chang (Georgia Institute of Technology), Athanasios Avgetidis (Georgia Institute of Technology), Manos Antonakakis (Georgia Institute of Technology), Fabian Monrose (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Read More

Cascading and Proxy Membership Inference Attacks

Yuntao Du (Purdue University), Jiacheng Li (Purdue University), Yuetian Chen (Purdue University), Kaiyuan Zhang (Purdue University), Zhizhen Yuan (Purdue University), Hanshen Xiao (Purdue University), Bruno Ribeiro (Purdue University), Ninghui Li (Purdue University)

Read More

Non-Disruptive Disruption: An Empirical Experience of Introducing LLMs in...

Francis Hahn (University of South Florida), Mohd Mamoon (University of Kansas), Alexandru G. Bardas (University of Kansas), Michael Collins (University of Southern California – ISI), Jaclyn Lauren Dudek (University of Kansas), Daniel Lende (University of South Florida), Xinming Ou (University of South Florida), S. Raj Rajagopalan (Resideo Technologies)

Read More