Ioannis Demertzis (University of Maryland), Javad Ghareh Chamani (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology & Sharif University of Technology), Dimitrios Papadopoulos (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Charalampos Papamanthou (University of Maryland)

We study the problem of dynamic searchable encryption (DSE) with forward-and-backward privacy. Many DSE schemes have been proposed recently but the most efficient ones have one limitation: they require maintaining an operation counter for each unique keyword, either stored locally at the client or accessed obliviously (e.g., with an oblivious map) at the server, during every operation. We propose three new schemes that overcome the above limitation and achieve constant permanent client storage with improved performance, both asymptotically and experimentally, compared to prior state-of-the-art works. In particular, our first two schemes adopt a "static-to-dynamic" transformation which eliminates the need for oblivious accesses during searches. Due to this, they are the first practical schemes with minimal client storage and non-interactive search. Our third scheme is the first quasi-optimal forward-and-backward DSE scheme with only a logarithmic overhead for retrieving the query result (independently of previous deletions). While it does require an oblivious access during search in order to keep permanent client storage minimal, its practical performance is up to four orders of magnitude better than the best existing scheme with quasi-optimal search.

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Honggang Yu (University of Florida), Kaichen Yang (University of Florida), Teng Zhang (University of Central Florida), Yun-Yun Tsai (National Tsing Hua University), Tsung-Yi Ho (National Tsing Hua University), Yier Jin (University of Florida)

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Sergey Frolov (University of Colorado Boulder), Jack Wampler (University of Colorado Boulder), Eric Wustrow (University of Colorado Boulder)

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Qiushi Wu (University of Minnesota), Yang He (University of Minnesota), Stephen McCamant (University of Minnesota), Kangjie Lu (University of Minnesota)

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Jared M. Smith (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Kyle Birkeland (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Tyler McDaniel (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Max Schuchard (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)

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