Sze Yiu Chau (Purdue University), Moosa Yahyazadeh (The University of Iowa), Omar Chowdhury (The University of Iowa), Aniket Kate (Purdue University), Ninghui Li (Purdue University)

We discuss how symbolic execution can be used to not only find low-level errors but also analyze the semantic correctness of protocol implementations. To avoid manually crafting test cases, we propose a strategy of meta-level search, which leverages constraints stemmed from the input formats to automatically generate concolic test cases. Additionally, to aid root-cause analysis, we develop constraint provenance tracking (CPT), a mechanism that associates atomic sub-formulas of path constraints with their corresponding source level origins. We demonstrate the power of symbolic analysis with a case study on PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Leveraging meta-level search and CPT, we analyzed 15 recent open-source implementations using symbolic execution and found semantic flaws in 6 of them. Further analysis of these flaws showed that 4 implementations are susceptible to new variants of the Bleichenbacher low- exponent RSA signature forgery. One implementation suffers from potential denial of service attacks with purposefully crafted signatures. All our findings have been responsibly shared with the affected vendors. Among the flaws discovered, 6 new CVEs have been assigned to the immediately exploitable ones.

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Countering Malicious Processes with Process-DNS Association

Suphannee Sivakorn (Columbia University), Kangkook Jee (NEC Labs America), Yixin Sun (Princeton University), Lauri Korts-Pärn (Cyber Defense Institute), Zhichun Li (NEC Labs America), Cristian Lumezanu (NEC Labs America), Zhenyu Wu (NEC Labs America), Lu-An Tang (NEC Labs America), Ding Li (NEC Labs America)

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Please Forget Where I Was Last Summer: The Privacy...

Kostas Drakonakis (FORTH, Greece), Panagiotis Ilia (FORTH, Greece), Sotiris Ioannidis (FORTH, Greece), Jason Polakis (University of Illinois at Chicago, USA)

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Fine-Grained and Controlled Rewriting in Blockchains: Chameleon-Hashing Gone Attribute-Based

David Derler (DFINITY), Kai Samelin (TÜV Rheinland i-sec GmbH), Daniel Slamanig (AIT Austrian Institute of Technology), Christoph Striecks (AIT Austrian Institute of Technology)

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Stealthy Adversarial Perturbations Against Real-Time Video Classification Systems

Shasha Li (University of California Riverside), Ajaya Neupane (University of California Riverside), Sujoy Paul (University of California Riverside), Chengyu Song (University of California Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (University of California Riverside), Amit K. Roy Chowdhury (University of California Riverside), Ananthram Swami (United States Army Research Laboratory)

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