Guangke Chen (Pengcheng Laboratory), Yedi Zhang (National University of Singapore), Fu Song (Key Laboratory of System Software (Chinese Academy of Sciences) and State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Science; Nanjing Institute of Software Technology), Ting Wang (Stony Brook University), Xiaoning Du (Monash University), Yang Liu (Nanyang Technological University)

Singing voice conversion (SVC) automates song covers by converting a source singing voice from a source singer into a new singing voice with the same lyrics and melody as the source, but sounds like being covered by the target singer of some given target singing voices. However, it raises serious concerns about copyright and civil right infringements. We propose SongBsAb, the first proactive approach to tackle SVC-based illegal song covers. SongBsAb adds perturbations to singing voices before releasing them, so that when they are used, the process of SVC will be interfered, leading to unexpected singing voices. Perturbations are carefully crafted to (1) provide a dual prevention, i.e., preventing the singing voice from being used as the source and target singing voice in SVC, by proposing a gender-transformation loss and a high/low hierarchy multi-target loss, respectively; and (2) be harmless, i.e., no side-effect on the enjoyment of protected songs, by refining a psychoacoustic model-based loss with the backing track as an additional masker, a unique accompanying element for singing voices compared to ordinary speech voices. We also adopt a frame-level interaction reduction-based loss and encoder ensemble to enhance the transferability of SongBsAb to unknown SVC models. We demonstrate the prevention effectiveness, harmlessness, and robustness of SongBsAb on five diverse and promising SVC models, using both English and Chinese datasets, and both objective and human study-based subjective metrics. Our work fosters an emerging research direction for mitigating illegal automated song covers.

View More Papers

SHAFT: Secure, Handy, Accurate and Fast Transformer Inference

Andes Y. L. Kei (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Sherman S. M. Chow (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Read More

ReThink: Reveal the Threat of Electromagnetic Interference on Power...

Fengchen Yang (Zhejiang University; ZJU QI-ANXIN IoT Security Joint Labratory), Zihao Dan (Zhejiang University; ZJU QI-ANXIN IoT Security Joint Labratory), Kaikai Pan (Zhejiang University; ZJU QI-ANXIN IoT Security Joint Labratory), Chen Yan (Zhejiang University; ZJU QI-ANXIN IoT Security Joint Labratory), Xiaoyu Ji (Zhejiang University; ZJU QI-ANXIN IoT Security Joint Labratory), Wenyuan Xu (Zhejiang University; ZJU…

Read More

Evaluating LLMs Towards Automated Assessment of Privacy Policy Understandability

Keika Mori (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC, Waseda University), Daiki Ito (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Takumi Fukunaga (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Takuya Watanabe (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Yuta Takata (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Masaki Kamizono (Deloitte Tohmatsu Cyber LLC), Tatsuya Mori (Waseda University, NICT, RIKEN AIP)

Read More

PhantomLiDAR: Cross-modality Signal Injection Attacks against LiDAR

Zizhi Jin (Zhejiang University), Qinhong Jiang (Zhejiang University), Xuancun Lu (Zhejiang University), Chen Yan (Zhejiang University), Xiaoyu Ji (Zhejiang University), Wenyuan Xu (Zhejiang University)

Read More