Ruisheng Shi (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Zhiyuan Peng (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Lina Lan (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Yulian Ge (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Peng Liu (Penn State University), Qin Wang (CSIRO Data61), Juan Wang (Wuhan University)

Eclipse attack is a major threat to the blockchain network layer, wherein an attacker isolates a target node by monopolizing all its connections, cutting it off from the rest of the network. Despite the attack's demonstrated effectiveness in Bitcoin (Usenix'15, SP'20, Usenix'21, CCS'21, SP'23) and partially in Ethereum (NDSS'23, SP'23), its applicability to a wider range of blockchain systems remains uncertain.

In this paper, we investigate eclipse attacks against Monero, a blockchain system known for its strong anonymity and pioneering the use of Dandelion++ (the state-of-the-art blockchain network layer protocol for transaction privacy protection). Our analysis of Monero's connection management mechanism reveals that existing eclipse attacks are surprisingly ineffective against Monero. We accordingly introduce the first practical eclipse attack against Monero by proposing a connection reset approach, which forces the target node to drop all benign connections and reconnect with malicious nodes. Specifically, we outline two methods for executing such an attack. The first one exploits the private transaction mechanisms, while the second method leverages the differences in propagation between stem transactions and fluff transactions under Dandelion++. Our attack is not only applicable to Monero but to all blockchain systems utilizing Dandelion++ and similar connection management strategies.

We conduct experiments on the Monero mainnet. Evaluation results confirm the feasibility of our attack. Unlike existing eclipse attacks, our connection reset-based approach does not require restarting the target node, significantly accelerating the attack process and making it more controllable. We also provide countermeasures to mitigate the proposed eclipse attack while minimizing the impact on Monero. In addition, we have ethically reported our investigation to Monero official team.

View More Papers

JBomAudit: Assessing the Landscape, Compliance, and Security Implications of...

Yue Xiao (IBM Research), Dhilung Kirat (IBM Research), Douglas Lee Schales (IBM Research), Jiyong Jang (IBM Research), Luyi Xing (Indiana University Bloomington), Xiaojing Liao (Indiana University)

Read More

Trim My View: An LLM-Based Code Query System for...

Sima Arasteh (University of Southern California), Pegah Jandaghi, Nicolaas Weideman (University of Southern California/Information Sciences Institute), Dennis Perepech, Mukund Raghothaman (University of Southern California), Christophe Hauser (Dartmouth College), Luis Garcia (University of Utah Kahlert School of Computing)

Read More

Towards LLM-Assisted Vulnerability Detection and Repair for Open-Source 5G...

Rupam Patir (University at Buffalo), Qiqing Huang (University at Buffalo), Keyan Guo (University at Buffalo), Wanda Guo (Texas A&M University), Guofei Gu (Texas A&M University), Haipeng Cai (University at Buffalo), Hongxin Hu (University at Buffalo)

Read More

Iris: Dynamic Privacy Preserving Search in Authenticated Chord Peer-to-Peer...

Angeliki Aktypi (University of Oxford), Kasper Rasmussen (University of Oxford)

Read More